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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MALCOLM N. McKINNON, 
Plaintiff-A ppellant, 
vs. 
T H E CORPORATION OF T H E 
P R E S I D E N T O F T H E C H U R C H 
O F J E S U S C H R I S T O F 
L A T T E R - D A Y SAINTS, 
a corporation, Defendant-B espondent. 
Case No. 
13553 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E N A T U R E O F 
T H E CASE 
Plaintiff-appellant seeks money damages against 
defendant-respondent arising out of respondent's breach 
of legal duty to provide appellant with a haulage right-
of-way to reach his substantial coal properties. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
Respondent moved the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, Judge Ernest F . Baldwin, 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Jr., presiding, for Summary Judgment. At the hearing, 
appellant requested leave to file an Amended Complaint 
and to add or substitute parties defendant. The Court 
granted respondent's motion for Summary Judgment 
and denied appellant's motions to amend his Complaint 
and to add or substitute parties. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's final 
Amended Order dismissing appellant's Complaint, 
denying appellant leave to file an Amended Complaint 
and to add to or substitute parties and prays that this 
Court order: 
1. That the case be remanded to the district court 
on its merits. 
2. That appellant should be permitted to file his 
Amended Complaint, and alternatively, 
3. That appellant's motion to add or substitute 
parties should be granted, if this Court should rule that 
the suit is now pending against the wrong defendant. 
S T A T E M E N T O F FACTS 
Appellant has been engaged in the business of coal 
mining and coal sales for in excess of twenty-five years. 
During all times herein pertinent he maintained large 
blocks of coal properties in Emery County, Utah, in 
his own name and in the name of his proprietorship, 
2 
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American Fuel Company. (McKinnon Deposition, pg. 
5) Appellant was and is a member of The Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (hereinafter referred 
to as the "Church") having been raised a member of this 
religious organization. (R. 75) Respondent is a cor-
poration sole and is the legal entity through which the 
Church operates its various programs among which is 
the General Church Welfare Program presided over 
by a General Church Welfare Committee. (Peterson 
Deposition, pg. 4) 
In the early 1940's the Church began a concerted 
effort to acquire coal properties to insure supply for 
its welfare programs and for general Church opera-
tions. (Troseth Deposition, pg. 4) In 1958, Mr. Leonard 
E. Adams was nominated General Manager of coal 
properties of the General Church Welfare Committee 
under the supervision of Henry D. Moyle. (McArthur 
Deposition, pg. 7) Negotiations were thereafter con-
ducted between appellant and the Church toward sale 
of the entirety of appellant's Emery County coal prop-
erties to the Church but no agreement was reached. 
(McKinnon Deposition, Exhibit 2) Subsequently, 
Adams contacted appellant regarding the purchase by 
the Church of 480 acres of fee coal land owned by 
appellant. (McKinnon Deposition, Exhibit 1) This 
sale was consummated in 1959). (Exhibit 2P) 
At that time, appellant had an applicant's interest 
in contiguous coal properties owned by the United 
States and managed by the Bureau of Land Manage-
3 
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ment among which was a 640 acre parcel. (McKinnon 
Deposition, Exhibit 5) Traversing the area adjacent 
to the 480 acres were known faults and appellant was 
retaining his preferential applicant's interest in the 
contiguous 640 acres to provide a practical hallway 
around the end of the fault should the fault penetrate 
his then mining operations to provide access to a large 
block of coal reserves he controlled. (McKinnon Depo-
sition, Exhibit 2) At that time no one knew the exact 
extent of the fault or faults and therefore control of 
the 640 acres was absolutely critical to appellant's long 
range mining plan. (Troseth Deposition, pg. 6) 
In early 1959 Leonard Adams contacted appellant 
on behalf of the General Church Welfare Committee to 
determine if appellant would relinquish his interest in 
the 640 acre preference parcel and assist the Church 
in acquiring the B.L.M. lease thereon. (McKinnon 
Deposition, Exhibit 1) Appellant indicated his willing-
ness to assist his Church in this endeavor but only on 
the express condition that he could reserve a right-of-
way to guarantee him access around the fault to pro-
vide access to his other coal property. (McKinnon 
Deposition, Exhibit 2) On March 12, 1959 Leonard 
Adams wrote to plaintiff regarding the desire of the 
Church to acquire the preference parcel and further 
suggesting that appellant make a contribution to the 
Church in the sum of $14,000.00. (McKinnon Depo-
sition, Exhibit 2) Subsequently on March 17, 1959 
appelant notified Adams that he would favorably 
consider the proposal with this caveat: 
4 
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I would like to present a proposition, wherein 
the Church applies for the acreage I asked for 
in my lease modification, along with other acre-
age suitable to Church use, and after the lease 
is granted, assign to me a portion of the land 
I applied for in my lease modification. I need 
a portion of this land in order to develop a prac-
tical haulage-way to the West that will go around 
the end of the fault that is running in a South-
westerly direction and could cut me off if I do 
not have some additional land to the South (Mc-
Kinnon Deposition, Exhibit 2). 
Appellant then discussed the Church's proposal 
with his attorney who in turn met with President Henry 
D. Moyle. The attorney indicated that appellant was 
agreeable to making this preference parcel available 
to the Church and to make an additional contribution 
of $14,000.00 if the Church would provide the right-
of-way. The deposition of the attorney reveals the 
following colloquy: 
Q. During the initial discussion with President 
Moyle did President Moyle make any response 
to your request or suggestion? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. Can you tell us your best recollection now of 
what President Moyle said on that first occasion? 
A. When he looked at the maps and after I got 
through explaining them to him, he said, 'Well, 
Frank, there's no problem there'. H e said, 'if 
those faults extend into our ground we will 
arrange to give him a right-of-way to go around 
them.' 
Q. And by 'we' did you understand him to mean 
5 
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the Corporation of the President of The Church 
organization would grant to Mr. McKinnon that 
right-of-way? 
A. Yes, that's true (Armstrong deposition,, 
p.8-9). 
At the conclusion of the meeting President Moyle 
stated to appellant's counsel "We will wait until we 
get the lease and then we will prepare a right-of-way 
for him." (Armstrong deposition, p. 10). 
Appellant had been taught to believe by virtue of 
the teachings received by him as a member of The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints: 
1. That the Church was divinely organized and 
restored to the earth in this dispensation by Jesus 
Christ himself and by other resurrected beings 
acting directly under his supervision. 
2. That one of the primary purposes and func-
tions of the organization of the Church was to 
provide an appropriate organization to assist all 
men in attaining perfection in this life and hence 
to earn the right to eternal life and exaltation. 
3. That Henry D. Moyle, with whom he dealt 
and upon whom he relied in the transactions 
here involved, was not only an authorized agent 
and General Authority of the Church, but more 
especially a direct representative of God and 
that Leonard Adams and Alfred Uhrhan, the 
other Church representatives with whom he dealt 
and upon whom he relied, were authorized agents 
or representatives of the Church. 
4. That the honesty and integrity of the Church 
and its General Authorities, its officers, its 
agents, and representative, including Henry D. 
6 
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Moyle, Leonard Adams, and Alfred Uhrhan 
was wholly beyond repute and unimpeachable 
and for him to consider otherwise would be 
heresy. 
5. That the welfare program of the Church 
which was to be the repository of the coal prop-
erties here involved was inspired of the Lord 
and was an important and vital program of the 
Church. (R. 76) 
Appellant's counsel reported the substance of his 
conversations with President Moyle and appellant there-
after prepared two checks totalling $14,000.00 made 
payable to the Church and abandoned his interest in 
the preference parcel sought by the Church. Appellant 
subsequently wrote a letter to President Moyle indi-
cating that he was holding the $14,000.00 donation and 
desired to have the formal right-of-way documented 
"in accordance with the understanding (Moyle) had 
with (appellant's counsel)." (McKinnon deposition, 
Exhibit 7). At no time did President Moyle or any 
other representative of the Church dispute or deny the 
understanding reached between Moyle acting for the 
Church and appellant's counsel. 
The checks were then delivered by counsel to 
President Moyle, who stated "We will hold these checks 
until we can give you the right-of-way and until we 
get the lease from the Government." (Armstrong 
deposition, p. 13). The two checks totalling $14,000.00 
were handed by President Moyle to the Secretary of 
the General Church Welfare Committee, Alfred W. 
Uhrhan, who placed them in an envelope and wrote 
7 
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on the cover "hold two checks totalling $14,000.00 
Malcolm McKinnon tendered for right-of-way. This 
matter is pending." (McKinnon deposition, Exhibit 
12). Appellant then assisted the Church in acquiring 
the 640 acre parcel and although several requests were 
made by appellant for a memorialization of the right-
of-way agreement, none was ever forthcoming and in 
1966 the Church leased the 640 acres to Peabody Coal 
Company without reserving the promised right-of-way 
to appellant. Respondent's Exhibit "A", pg. 38 and 
40) 
The Church maintains a recognized internal pro-
cedure through which Church members may bring 
grievances before the Church. (Curtis Deposition, pg. 
13-14) Upon being apprised of the transfer of the 
property by the Church to Peabody Coal Company, 
appellant sought to take advantage of this ecclesiastical 
grievance procedure. (Curtis Deposition, pg. 15) H e 
presented his claim through his own Bishop, Stake 
President and a close friend who was also a Stake 
President and eventually met personally with President 
N. Eldon Tanner of the First Presidency of the Church 
in the company of both his attorney and one of the 
Stake Presidents. (Armstrong Deposition, pg. 18) 
President Tanner was unable to explain the retention 
by the Church of the $14,000.00 donation and indicated 
to those present that appellant's grievance should be 
put "at rest" until appellant found out whether he could 
go around the fault on his own property. (Armstrong 
Deposition, pg. 20) It is undisputed that the procedure 
8 
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followed by appellant was the recognized grievance 
procedure for a member's claim against the Church. 
(Curtis Deposition, pg. 14-15) No right-of-way has 
ever been granted appellant. (McKinnon Deposition, 
pg. 55) 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I. 
T H E E X I S T E N C E OF D I S P U T E D ISSUES 
OF M A T E R I A L FACTS P R E C L U D E S T H E 
G R A N T I N G OF SUMMARY J U D G M E N T AS 
A M A T T E R OF LAW. 
It is axiomatic that Summary Judgment is im-
proper when there exist disputed issues of material 
facts. Transamerica Title Insurance Company v. United 
Resources, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 346, 471 P.2d 165 (1970) ; 
Reliable Furniture Company v. Fidelity & Guarantee 
Insurance Underwriters, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 
P.2d 685 (1965). The appellant submits that the lower 
court erred in granting respondent Summary Judg-
ment as there exist in this matter a plethora of disputed 
factual issues and, more particularly, that the grounds 
set forth in the Amended Order dismissing appellant's 
Complaint are insufficient when viewed as they must be 
on appeal in a light most favorable to appellant. Morris 
v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297 
(1953). The lower court set them forth as follows: 
A. The defendant is not a proper defendant; 
9 
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B. The cause of action is barred by the Utah 
Statute of Limitations; and 
C. The issue of damages is either moot or not sus-
ceptible to legal determination (R. 10). 
Each of these enumerated bases involves genuine 
issues and as there has been no showing by respondent 
which precludes as a matter of law the awarding of any 
relief to appellant, Tan/tier v. Utah Poultry k Farmers 
Cooperative, 11 Utah 2d 353, 359 P.2d 18 (1961); 
Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah 
2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960) summary relief is improper. 
A. P R O P E R P A R T Y D E F E N D A N T 
A R G U M E N T 
Respondent avers and the lower Court agreed that 
respondent "The Corporation of The President of The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints" is not a 
proper party defendant. Appellant submits that re-
spondent is the proper party defendant, or in the 
alternative, that appellant should have been granted 
opportunity on motion duly made, accepted but denied 
by the Court below, to add or substitute parties de-
fendant. I t is undisputed that all of appellant's contacts 
during the formation of the underlying agreement which 
gave rise to this action were with representatives of The 
Corporation of the President of The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints. 
Appellant and appellant's agents met with Henry 
10 
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D. Moyle, an agent and employee of The Corporation 
of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints, who struck the bargain whereby 
appellant would transfer to respondent appellant's 
interest in the 640 acre preference parcel and respondent 
would grant appellant a haulage right-of-way across 
the property should the need arise. (Armstrong Depo-
sition, pg. 9) In a prelude to this contractual relation-
ship, appellant had sold respondent 480 acres of fee 
property and had received in payment therefor a check 
drawn on respondent The Corporation of the President 
of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. 
(Exhibit 2P) In furtherance of this agreement, 
appellant made a $14,000.00 contribution payable to 
"The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints" and 
it is beyond cavil that the The Corporation of the Presi-
dent of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
is the legal entity which holds title to property donated 
in its name or to the name of the "Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints". 
Respondent contended during argument that it 
was not a proper party defendant and that the proper 
party defendant was Cooperative Security Corporation. 
(Respondent's Opening Brief, pg. 6) At no time did 
appellant have any contact with employees or repre-
sentatives of Cooperative Security Corporation; his 
exclusive contact was with representatives of respond-
ent, more particularly: Leonard Adams, the then 
General Manager of the Church Coal Mine Properties; 
Henry D. Moyle, a Second Counselor in The Church 
11 
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of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; and Alfred W. 
Uhrhan, an employee of the General Church Welfare 
Committee. (Peterson Deposition, pg. 7) I t is true 
that the Cooperative Security Corporation was the legal 
entity which eventually took title to the 640 acres which 
appellant transferred to respondent as its designee but 
appellant is not required to bring this action against 
respondent's nominee or designee. Appellant has never 
contended or effectuated any contractual relationship 
with Cooperative Security Corporation. 
From the statement of the Trial Judge below at 
hearing (R. 10), we assume that he deemed the appro-
priate party defendant to be the "Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints", an unincorporated association, 
and, consequently, that both appellant and respondent 
were in error as to the proper identity of the defendant. 
In any event, appellant, without waiving his position 
that the "Corporation of the President" was the proper 
party defendant, moved to be permitted to add the 
"Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints", an 
unincorporated association, Cooperative Security Cor-
poration, and any other legal entity pressed by the Court 
or respondent as substitute or additional defendants. 
That motion, although accepted by the Court, was 
denied on its merits. 
If this Court determines that the "Corporation of 
the President" is not the proper party defendant, then 
it must further rule that the Court below erred in not 
granting the motion of appellant to add or substitute 
12 
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parties. Otherwise, form would certainly triumph over 
substance and manifest injustice would prevail. If the 
Trial Judge had asked for the real defendant to stand, 
it would have been the same "body" whether in the form 
of the "Corporation of the President", the unincorpo-
rated association, Cooperative Security Corporation or 
some other controlled pseudonym or designee. Such 
a charade of musical chairs should be beneath the dignity 
of a self-declared agent of deity, and, even applying 
general principles of law and equity which are less 
divine, would, if successful, shock the conscience and 
defy the most primitive concepts of fairness and jus-
tice.1 
It follows that the Court below erred grievously 
and that the Judgment must be reversed. 
B. T H E C L A I M E D BAR OF T H E STAT-
U T E OF L I M I T A T I O N S 
The second ground enumerated by the lower court 
in dismissing appellant's Complaint was that the cause 
of action is barred by the four (4) year Utah Statute 
of Limitations, §78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated. Even 
the most cursory review of the record indicates beyond 
question that appellant raised significant factual issues 
which preclude respondent from beneficial reliance on 
the Statute of Limitations. 
1. First is the existence of the special fiduciary 
1 No religious bias should be assumed from the foregoing argu-
ment for its scrivener is an active member in good standing of 
the same church. 
13 
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relationship between appellant and respondent. This 
was not, by any means, an ordinary business trans-
action. Appellant in his untraversed affidavit states: 
That the entire transaction which is the subject 
of this controversy was colored by the Church 
and its self-declared mission as described gen-
erally herein, his membership therein and his 
belief and faith in its mission, purpose, honesty 
and integrity, together with that of its officers, 
agents, and representatives. (R. 77) 
I t is undisputed that appellant would not have 
dealt with respondent at all and would not have per-
formed any of the acts which gave rise to this contro-
versy but for the existence of the special fiduciary 
relationship. Appellant had been engaged for years 
in the coal business and recognized the necessity of 
maintaining access to his properties. However, when 
appellant was approached by Leonard Adams and the 
negotiations were conducted with Henry D. Moyle, 
appellant was dealing with what he believed to be the 
direct representative of God (R. 76) and further 
believed that the welfare program of the Church which 
was to be the repository of the coal properties here 
involved was inspired of the Lord and was an important 
and vital program of the Church. (R. 76) Because of 
appellants' belief and faith he did not take the pre-
cautions in dealing with respondent in this transaction 
as he would have taken in dealing with mere mortals 
or their institutions. (R. 76) 
Appellant had been induced by respondents' own 
specific teachings to believe that he was dealing with 
14 
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God's chosen representative in aid of God's special 
purposes. He had been led to believe by the Church 
itself that the contiguous preferred mining properties 
as to which he held a preference and which were abso-
lutely necessary to the future mining of his properties 
were critically needed by the Church's inspired welfare 
program. Appellant was a member in good standing of 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and 
as such had been taught that Henry D. Moyle, as a 
member of the First Presidency, was a person directly 
revelating with God on behalf of the Church and for 
the guidance and protection of all members of the 
Church, including appellant. (R. 76) This special and 
unique relationship removed respondent's agents from 
the mundanities of every day business transactions and 
placed all of the dealings between appellant and re-
spondent on a higher plane. 
Under special confidential relationships such as 
those here controlling, the courts have removed the 
otherwise protective umbrella of Statute of Limitations. 
One case is Atlas Corporation v. Mag dam, 130 Ne-
braska 519, 265 N.W. 473 (1936), involving the rela-
tionship between a bank and one of its managing offi-
cers. The Court held at 265 N.W. 746: 
We are of the opinion that defendant Magdanz 
(manager) is estopped as against the bank and 
its assignee to plead either the Statute of Frauds 
or Limitations. Magdanz was cashier and active 
manager of the bank. He had charge of the note 
as such officer and it was his duty to enforce 
payment when due or report the situation to the 
15 
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Board of Directors for instructions. Instead of 
performing his duty, he made the endorsement 
and thereby concealed the fact that the note was 
due. H e should not now be permitted to take 
advantage of his wrong. 
The attorney-client relationship is of like confi-
dential nature and courts have precluded counsel from 
relying upon the Statute of Limitations when suit is 
brought by a disenchanted client. In Strangman v. 
Arc-Saws, 267 P.2d 395 (Cal. App. 1954), an action 
was initiated against an attorney by an ex-client who 
had been solicited by the attorney to invest money in 
a corporation in which the attorney was an officer and 
director. The attorney had concealed from the client 
the existence of the attorney's relationship with the 
corporation. The Court denied the attorney the defense 
of Statute of Limitations. See also Waugh v. Lennard, 
69 Ariz. 214, 211 P.2d 806 (1949). 
In a somewhat analogous case to the facts here 
presented, the California Appellate Court in Brown 
v. World Church, 77 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1969), considered 
a case wherein the Church through its pastor had bor-
rowed money from a parishioner and for an extended 
period of time the Church and minister repeatedly 
advised Mrs. Brown that her note was secure, that she 
need not contact counsel to collect the note and that 
if any person sued, it would become a sin against the 
Church and that she should have faith in her ministers. 
When suit was finally initiated, defendant Church and 
the ministers raised the defense of Statute of Limi-
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tations. The Court summarily estopped both from assert-
ing this defense. 
Appellant's state of mind is a factual issue which 
must be determined by the trier of fact and until such 
a determination as to the existence of a fiduciary rela-
tionship is made, no Summary Judgment can lie against 
him. 
2. The defense of Statute of Limitations is also 
non apropos and not available to respondent because 
respondent's conduct in persuading appellant to seek 
redress through respondent's grievance procedures 
lulled appellant into a false sense of security as appel-
lant reasonably believed the breach of agreement by 
respondent had occurred because of an innocent mis-
take on the part of respondent and its officers and rep-
resentatives and that the same could be and would be 
rectified through the internal grievance procedure of 
the Church. (R. 77) 
Appellant initiated his contacts with the Church 
prior to the running of any applicable Statute of Limi-
tations. One of the Church's authorized representatives 
characterized appellant's efforts in this regard as being 
consistent with its internal practice and policy. (Curtis 
Deposition, pg. 15) However, rather than promptly 
denying the claim to demonstrate to appellant the hope-
lessness of this procedure, respondent entreated appel-
lant to hold the matter in abeyance for an indefinite 
period. (Armstrong Deposition, pg. 20) It was not until 
after the four (4) year Statute of Limitations had run 
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that respondent, for the first time, indicated to appellant 
that respondent had no intention of granting him redress 
through this procedure. 
This Court has enunciated its displeasure as to such 
conduct in Rice v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 
22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969), at 22 Utah 2d 28: 
One cannot justly or equitably lull an adversary 
into a false sense of security thereby subjecting 
his claim to the bar of limitations and then be 
heard to plead that very delay as a defense to 
the action when brought. Acts or conduct which 
wrongfully induce a party to believe an amicable 
adjustment of his claim will be made may create 
an estoppel against the pleading of the Statute 
of Limitations. 
Rice, is, if possible, a weaker case than appellant's be-
cause in Rice only negotiations to compromise a claim 
were involved, whereas in appellant's situation, the 
equities weigh much heavier in his favor. 
Again, the intention of the parties and the existence 
of confidential and fiduciary relationships between them 
are matters of factual determination at a trial upon 
the merits and summary denial of such claims is error. 
O'Hair v. Kounalis, 23 Utah 2d 355, 463 P.2d 799 
(1970). See also Davis v. Dyer, 56 N.H. 143 (1875), 
wherein the New Hampshire Supreme Court in a case 
involving a suit between a parishioner and his Church 
where the Church's arbitration policy was first invoked 
held at 56 N.H. 146: 
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If in fact the plaintiff was induced to postpone 
bringing his suit by the agreement of the defend-
ant to refer and to perform the award for the 
period of time during which his legal right to 
commence a suit was thus put in abeyance by 
the agreement, I see no reason why that does 
not amount to an estoppel in pias which must 
prevent the defendants from availing themselves 
of the fact that the cause of action did not accrue 
within six years to defeat the action. However 
strong the probabilities on that subject may 
appear, the Court cannot say as a matter of law 
the fact was so. (Emphasis added) 
Furthermore, appellant's affidavit on this subject 
was uncontroverted. It follows then, for the purpose of 
motion for Summary Judgment, the Court below was 
legally bound to find the existence, not the absence, of 
this confidential and fiduciary relationship as a matter 
of law. 
It should be noted that plaintiff* did not proceed 
directly with his internal appeal through the grievance 
procedure of respondent simply out of an election of 
remedies; he did so because he had been informed and 
believed that the Church always strived to solve its 
problems internally and never brought such internal 
problems to light outside of its confines. (Curtis Depo-
sition, pg. 14) At a meeting conducted in the presence 
of then President N. Eldon Tanner, appellant and his 
attorney presented the facts surrounding his claim. 
President Tanner did not deny the claim and, on the 
contrary, suggested that the matter be tabled until such 
time as the actual situs of the fault could be ascertained. 
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At such subsequent time, Tanner promised, the Church 
would again review the matter. (Curtis Deposition, 
p. 11) 
An analogous case wherein a member of an organi-
zation availed himself of internal grievance procedures 
and thereby failed to file his civil action within the 
appropriate limitation period is Van Hook v. Southern 
California Waiters Alliance, 323 P.2d 212 (1958). In 
Van Hook the general secretary of the local union was 
offered other employment and so advised the union. The 
union thereupon granted him an extensive retirement 
program. Subsequently, the secretary lost a re-election 
bid and notified the union of his intent to secure the 
retirement program. Defendant thereupon refused to 
comply with its agreement and the matter was submitted 
through the union's internal arbitration procedures. 
After the Statute of Limitations had run for filing a 
civil action, plaintiff filed a civil complaint and defend-
ant union raised the defense of Statute of Limitations. 
The Court summarily denied defendant the right to 
claim the benefit of the Statute and held at 323 P.2d 
219: 
By its conduct herein the defendant lulled plain-
tiff into a sense of false security in implying 
that by proceeding through the successive steps 
of appeal provided by the constitution of the 
International Union his claim might be recog-
nized or a settlement reached. 'I t is well settled 
that where delay in commencing an action is in-
duced by conduct of the defendant, he cannot 
avail himself of the defense of statute of limita-
tions.' 
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C. T H E COURT B E L O W E R R E D AS A 
M A T T E R OF L A W I N I T S CONCLUSIONS AS 
TO "DAMAGES. ' ' 
The final ground enumerated by the lower court 
in granting respondent's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment is a statement that appellant having "leased his 
property without any dimunition in price to the owner 
of the property through which the alleged right-of-way 
was to be granted, makes the issues of damages either 
moot or not susceptible to legal determination." (R. 
10) This simply is not the fact! 
Summary Judgment is not the proper vehicle for 
ascertaining damages. The lower court's determination 
to resolve damages prior to receiving any testimony 
from witnesses, lay or expert, takes from the trier of 
fact one of its fundamental duties. I t is a touchstone 
of our judicial system that the determination and assess-
ment of damages is peculiarly within the province of 
the jury. Williams v. Lloyd, 16 Utah 2d 427, 403 P.2d 
166 (1965); Campbell v. Safeway Stores, Incorporated, 
15 Utah 2d 113, 388 P.2d 409 (1964). The proper 
method of determining damages is to put appellant in 
the position he would have been but for the breach of 
contract by respondent. 
I t is clear that the lower court's abrupt resolution 
of the damage issue is not proper; it, in no respect, 
attempts to determine the position in which plaintiff 
would have been had there been no breach. The damage 
question necessitates a finding of fact and the existence 
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of such factual issue precludes Summary Judgment on 
the damage issue. Elrod v. Preferred Risk Mutual In-
surance Company, Des Moines, Iowa, 201 Kan. 254, 
440 P.2d 544 (1968). 
Appellant submits that summary resolution by the 
lower court of each of the material factual issues raised 
herein was improper and that the existence of such 
issues mandates a remand of this matter for trial before 
a trier of fact. No other decision by this Court would 
satisfy appellant's right to trial of these issues on their 
merits. 
P O I N T I I . 
A P P E L L A N T S H O U L D H A V E B E E N AL-
L O W E D TO A M E N D H I S C O M P L A I N T TO 
AVER T H E E X I S T E N C E A N D B R E A C H O F 
A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST. 
It is uncontroverted that respondent obtained the 
640 acres through which appellant sought his haulage 
right-of-way by means of the underlying agreement 
with appellant. Respondent did so with full knowledge 
of the confidential relationship existing between itself 
and appellant as hereinabove set forth. Respondent 
obtained this property subject to a specific condition: 
The granting to appellant of the promised right-of-way. 
Respondent subsequently transferred the property 
without reserving such right-of-way to appellant. As 
a direct and proximate result of the actions of respond-
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ent, a constructive trust resulted covering the leasehold 
property with appellant as beneficiary. 
The existence of the constructive trust is implicit 
in the allegations of fact contained in the original Com-
plaint and it does not constitute a new cause of action. 
The decision of the lower court in denying appellant 
the opportunity to so amend is contrary to the interest 
of justice and serves no useful function but to frustrate 
a full hearing on the merits of the controversy. The 
amendment sought is proper and should have been per-
mitted. Larsen v. Gasberg, 43 Utah 203, 134 Pac. 885 
(1913) ; Fell v. Union Pac. By. Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 
Pac. 1003 (1907). 
This Court should allow the amendment alleging 
the existence and the breach of the constructive trust 
which arose from the fact setting of the original Com-
plaint as a matter of law. Respondent cannot claim to 
have been prejudiced by the amendment because re-
spondent has had notice from the beginning of this 
lawsuit that appellant was seeking enforcement of a 
claim arising out of the breach of respondent's agree-
ment to provide the right-of-way. The language of 
the United States Supreme Court in Tiller v. Atlantic 
Coastline Railroad Co., 323 U.S. 574 (1945), although 
written in a different factual context, is applicable here. 
In that suit, an action was commenced under the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act for a death resulting 
from negligence; it was held that an amendment to 
the complaint was properly permitted to state an addi-
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tional ground of negligence. The Court held at 323 
U.S. 581: 
The cause of action now, as it was in the begin-
ning, is the same—it is a suit to recover damages 
for the wrongful death of the deceased. 'The 
effect of the amendment here was to facilitate 
a fair trial of the existing issues between plain-
tiff and defendant.' Maty v. Grasselli Chemical 
Co., 303 US 197. There is no reason to apply a 
statute of limitations when, as here, the respond-
ent has had notice from the beginning that peti-
tioner was trying to enforce a claim against it 
because of the events leading up to the death of 
the deceased in the respondent's yard. 
Appellant has sustained damage as a result of 
respondent's breach of the constructive trust. When 
respondent sold the trust property in breach of the 
constructive trust it did so to the substantial detriment 
of the beneficiary, appellant. The determination of such 
damage is more particularly described in Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts, Sec. 208 (1) (b) providing that 
when a trustee sells property which is its duty to retain, 
the beneficiary can "charge him with the value at the 
time of the decree, with the income which would have 
accrued thereon if he had not sold it or require him 
to make specific reparation if this is reasonable under 
the circumstances." (Emphasis added) 
To now allow respondent to transfer this property 
free of the right-of-way agreement would constitute 
an unjust enrichment to respondent because respondent 
has received monetary consideration for the transfer 
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from Peabody Coal Company. This Court has recog-
nized the availability of constructive trust in similar 
fact situations, that such trust arises by operation of 
law and that sitting as a court of equity, the lower court 
is free to effect justice according to the equities peculiar 
to each transaction whenever a failure to perform a 
duty to convey property would result in unjust enrich-
ment. Haws v. Jensen, 116 Utah 212, 209 P.2d 229 
(1949). It should do so here. 
POINT I I I . 
A P P E L L A N T S MOTION TO A M E N D TO IN-
C L U D E A CLAIM FOR P U N I T I V E DAM-
A G E S W A S P R O P E R . 
Appellant sought permission from the lower court 
to file an Amended Complaint asserting an additional 
claim for punitive damages based upon the gross and 
aggravated nature of respondents breach of agreement 
and of its duties as constructive trustee and further 
avering the breaches to have been willful and malicious 
in nature. The motion was based upon facts developed 
through discovery after filing of the original Complaint 
which demonstrated the grievous nature of respondent's 
action and the inconsistency between its conduct toward 
appellant and its self-declared mission and the precepts 
which it espouses and which it expects from its many 
members including this appellant. 
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This breach arose out of a relationship of strictest 
confidentiality and highest trust in that appellant has 
been continually assured and reassured by represen-
tatives of respondent that the Church would never act 
consciously in such a manner as to cause injury to a 
member such as himself and that a member should 
believe in the promises of such representatives implicitly. 
This claim for punitive damages in no way states 
a new cause of action and does not prejudice respondent 
in its defense of this action. I t is merely a new element 
of damages having its source in the same occurrence 
as were the subject of the original Complaint. See 
Scalise v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, 47 F.R.D. 148 
(1969). The Court erred in refusing to allow the amend-
ment. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has presented this Court with a com-
pendium of the material factual issues which had not 
been resolved and which existed at the time of the pre-
cipitous action of the trial court in granting Summary 
Judgment. Appellant has further shown that no 
grounds or bases whatsoever existed for the court below 
to deny appellant the opportunity to present his cause 
to a trier of fact. Appellant respectfully submits that 
the decision of the lower court must be reversed and 
this matter remanded for trial on its merits, with appel-
lant being permitted to amend his Complaint to aver 
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the existence and breach of a constructive trust and 
for punitive damages as well as opportunity to add or to 
substitute parties defendant if required. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Keith E. Taylor 
LeRoy S. Axland 
of and for 
PARSONS, B E H L E & L A T I M E R 
79 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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